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PLANTINGA’S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY, 
SKEPTICAL THEISM, AND DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS
Andrew Moon
Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many 
debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed 
that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view 
often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a com-
mon way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common 
way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics’ 
claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of 
Plantinga’s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religion-
based argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible 
with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking argu-
ments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what 
I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships the 
goods of which entail the belief that God exists. 
I. Introduction
Alvin Plantinga, reflecting on his days as a young philosopher at Wayne 
State University, writes,
[George] Nakhnikian was our chairman; he thought well of my powers as 
a budding young philosopher, but also thought that no intelligent person 
could possibly be a Christian. He would announce this sentiment in his usu-
al stentorian tones, whereupon Robert Sleigh would say, “But what about 
Al, George? Don’t you think he’s an intelligent person?” George would have 
to admit, reluctantly, that he thought I probably was, but he still thought 
there had to be a screw loose in there somewhere.1
Developmental psychologist Paul Bloom writes,
Recently psychologists doing research on the minds of infants have discov-
ered two related facts . . . One: human beings come into the world with a 
predisposition to believe in supernatural phenomena. And two: this pre-
disposition is an incidental by-product of cognitive functioning gone awry.2
These quotes challenge the claim that theistic beliefs are formed by reli-
able, properly functioning faculties. They are examples of what Plantinga 
1Plantinga, “A Christian Life,” 64. 
2Bloom, “Is God an Accident?”
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calls de jure objections to theistic belief, which claim that theistic belief lacks 
a valuable epistemic property. De jure objections are distinct from de facto 
objections, which claim that theistic belief is false. Arguments that often 
support de jure objections are now popularly called debunking arguments, 
which criticize a belief on the basis of how it was formed.
Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology in Warranted Christian Belief has 
been used to respond to many de jure objections (or debunking arguments) 
against theistic belief.3 However, critics have claimed that Plantinga’s re-
ligious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in 
response to the problem of evil.4 If they are correct, then a common way of 
responding to debunking arguments against theistic belief conflicts with a 
common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine 
in detail both whether there is any such conflict and also whether there are 
feasible ways to resolve that conflict. I argue that the prospects are bleak. I 
then present two revised versions of Plantinga’s argument for his religious 
epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an 
intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and 
both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to 
theistic beliefs of persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relation-
ships with God—valuable relationships with goods that entail the belief 
that God exists.
Although skeptical theists have obvious reasons to be interested in this 
paper, here is one reason worth making explicit. It is common to think that 
skeptical theism conflicts with many arguments for God’s existence.5 As 
a result, the skeptical theist might be tempted to embrace reformed episte-
mology, which says that theistic belief can be warranted or rational even if it 
is not based on argument.6 But the most influential version of reformed epis-
temology is Plantinga’s. Hence, such a skeptical theist should be interested 
in whether her view conflicts with the most influential version of reformed 
epistemology.7
3For some illustrations of the influence of Plantinga’s religious epistemology on the reli-
gious debunking literature, see White, “You Just Believe That Because . . . ,” 583; Clark and 
Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 21–22; Dawes and Jong, “Defeating the Chris-
tian’s Claim”; Murray and Schloss, “Evolutionary Accounts of Religion,” 251–252; Moon, 
“Recent Work,” 881–882; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments,” 280–282; Wielenberg, “Evolu-
tionary Debunking Arguments,” 89–90; McNabb and Baldwin, “Divine Methodology”; and 
Law, “The X-Claim Argument.”
4See Fales, “Critical Discussion” and McBrayer and Swenson, “Skepticism About the Ar-
gument from Divine Hiddenness,” which will be discussed later in the paper.
5For example, see Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism,” 389; Lovering, “On What God Would 
Do”; O’Connor, “Theistic Objections”; Wilks, “The Structure”; and Wilks, “The Global Skep-
ticism Objection.”
6Lovering (“On What God Would Do,” 97) says that his argument for the inconsistency 
of skeptical theism and arguments from natural theology does not pertain to reformed epis-
temology. 
7It might not conflict with all versions of reformed epistemology. See Tucker, “Phenom-
enal Conservatism.”
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II. Skeptical Theism
Following Michael Bergmann, let skeptical theism consist in the conjunction 
of theism with three claims:
ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we 
know of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we 
know of are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations 
we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible 
evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between 
possible goods and the permission of possible evils.8
Suppose that ST1 is true. It could be that the goods we know of just are all 
the possible goods, or they are just a tiny sample. We don’t know. But if we 
do not know that the possible goods we know of are representative of the 
possible goods there are, then we do not know that the possible reasons 
God has for acting that we know about are representative of the total set 
of reasons God might have for acting. ST2 and ST3 similarly describe more 
ways in which we might be ignorant about God’s reasons.
To be clear, ST1–ST3 do not imply that we do not know any of God’s 
reasons. For example, the skeptical theist can endorse ST1 and still affirm 
that some things are good, and hence, as goods, they can figure into God’s 
reasons. (Plausibly, something’s being good is a reason, albeit a defea-
sible one, for God to instantiate it.) What she cannot know is whether the 
known possible goods are representative of the total set of possible goods. 
Thus, it is possible that God has reasons unknown by us.
Here is a way to apply ST1–ST3 to a version of the problem of evil. 
Suppose someone argues that since we cannot think of a reason for why 
God would allow a particularly horrendous event, there likely is no such 
reason; therefore, God probably does not exist. Skeptical theism implies 
that the first inference is illicit since we might not be privy to the total set 
of reasons God has for acting.9 Again, skeptical theism is not saying that 
we cannot know that the horrendous event was evil or that, since it was 
evil, God didn’t have a reason to stop it. Skeptical theism simply implies 
that since we do not know if the goods and evils we know of are represen-
tative of the possible goods and evils there are, we may not infer that God 
had an all-things-considered reason to stop it.
8See Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” 376–381) for a detailed explanation of these theses 
and how they represent the skepticism expressed by many skeptical theists. In that reference, 
as well as in Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12, Bergmann also adds an 
ST4 to the definition of “skeptical theism.” I do not include it for the sake of brevity, and 
nothing in this paper depends on its addition.
9See Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism,” 389 and Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical 
Theism” for the application of ST1–ST3 to other formulations of the problem of evil.
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It is worth noting that there are other definitions of “skeptical theism” 
besides Bergmann’s. I picked his definition because he is a prominent 
skeptical theist, and his version is at least as clearly defined and well 
defended as any other in the literature. Furthermore, I suspect that any 
claims I make about Bergmann’s skeptical theism could be made about 
other versions of skeptical theism. Lastly, I only need ST1 to make the 
claims I wish to make about skeptical theism and its relation to Plantinga’s 
religious epistemology; skeptical theists who do not accept all of ST1–ST3, 
but accept at least ST1, should agree with my conclusions.10
III. Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology
III.A. Background
In this subsection, I explain Plantinga’s theory of warrant and his view 
about how people often form theistic beliefs. Plantinga technically defines 
“warrant” as whatever it is that makes the difference between knowledge 
and mere true belief. He then defends his proper functionalist theory of 
warrant, which says,
[A] belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S 
by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a 
cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, 
according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth.11
For example, my belief that there is a plant in front of me is warranted if and 
only if the belief was formed by properly functioning visual faculties, in 
an environment appropriate for my visual faculties (good lighting condi-
tions), and the design plan of my visual faculties is successfully aimed 
at truth.12 On the other hand, if I had Capgras Syndrome and thereby 
believed that my mother is an imposter, then this belief would not be war-
ranted because the mechanisms forming this belief were disordered.
I will assume that Plantinga’s proper functionalist theory is correct. 
This is a controversial assumption since every theory of warrant is con-
troversial.13 Even still, I will assume it is correct so that I can focus on 
other interesting issues, and it is best to focus on one thing at a time. Fur-
thermore, even if it is incorrect, it is still an interesting question whether 
10For discussion of many definitions of “skeptical theism,” see Rea, “Skeptical Theism,” 
484–486. Although Rea does not specifically include ST1–ST3 into his definition of skeptical 
theism, he does say that they are “an important part of a typical defense of skeptical theism” 
(485). If he is correct, the skeptical theist should still be interested in this paper since it as-
sesses whether Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with a typical defense of skeptical 
theism, even if it doesn’t assess whether Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with 
skeptical theism tout court.
11Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 156.
12The quote only states necessary conditions, but for the purposes of this paper, we can 
take them to be sufficient. The additional conditions are caveats to ward off Gettier cases, 
which are irrelevant here.
13For recent defenses of proper functionalism, see Boyce and Plantinga, “Proper Func-
tionalism” and Boyce and Moon, “In Defense of Proper Functionalism.” 
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theistic beliefs can meet these proper functionalist conditions. Note that 
in the above quotes, neither Nakhnikian nor Bloom explicitly denied war-
rant to theistic belief. They only claimed either that it was the result of a 
“loose screw” or “a cognitive mechanism gone awry,” i.e., not the result of 
proper function or reliable belief formation.
Plantinga thinks that many theistic beliefs are not formed on the basis 
of an argument. Rather, he takes the view that “there is a kind of faculty 
or cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinitatis, or sense of 
divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs 
about God.”14 The following example from Jean-Paul Sartre in his auto-
biography might be an example of the workings of the sensus divinitatis:
Only once did I have the feeling that [God] existed. I had been playing 
with matches and burnt a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my 
crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt his gaze inside my head and on 
my hands. I whirled about in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target. 
Indignation saved me. I flew into a rage against so crude an indiscretion. I 
blasphemed . . . He never looked at me again.15
Here is another example from C. S. Lewis:
You must picture me alone in that room in Magdalen, night after night, feel-
ing, whenever my mind lifted even for a second from my work, the steady, 
unrelenting approach of Him whom I so earnestly desired not to meet. That 
which I greatly feared had at last come upon me. In the Trinity Term of 1929 
I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed: perhaps, 
that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England.16
Sartre formed the belief that God sees me, and Lewis formed the belief that 
God is approaching. The beliefs do not seem to have been formed on the 
basis of inference or argument. The question, now, is whether such beliefs 
can be warranted.17
III.B. Plantinga’s Argument and De Jure Objections
A central part of Plantinga’s religious epistemology is his claim that if God 
exists, then theistic beliefs are probably warranted. Here is Plantinga’s 
argument for this claim:
[I]f theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that it does have warrant. If it is 
true, then there is, indeed, such a person as God, a person who has created 
us in his image (so that we resemble him, among other things, in having the 
capacity for knowledge), who loves us, who desires that we know and love 
him, and who is such that it is our end and good to know and love him. But 
if these things are so, then he would of course intend that we be able to be 
aware of his presence and to know something about him. And if that is so, 
14Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 172.
15Quoted in Bering, The Belief Instinct, 41.
16Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 228–229.
17For discussion of whether there is any such thing as a sensus divinitatis, see § 5 of Moon, 
“Recent Work” and the references therein.
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the natural thing to think is that he created us in such a way that we would 
come to hold such true beliefs as that there is such a person as God, that he 
is our creator, that we owe him obedience and worship, that he is worthy 
of worship, that he loves us, and so on. And if that is so, then the natural 
thing to think is that the cognitive processes that do produce belief in God 
are aimed by their designer at producing that belief. But then the belief in 
question will be produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly ac-
cording to a design plan successfully aimed at truth: it will therefore have 
warrant.18
Here is a reconstruction of his argument:
1) If God exists, then God created us in his image, loves us, desires 
that we know and love him, and is such that it is our end to know 
and love him.
2) If God created us in his image, loves us, desires that we know and 
love him, and is such that it is our end to know and love him, then 
God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be 
aware of his presence and know something about him.
3) If God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be 
aware of his presence and know something about him, then God 
probably created us in such a way that we would come to hold cer-
tain true beliefs about God (e.g., that God exists, is our creator, and 
loves us).
4) If God probably created us in such a way that we would come to 
hold certain true beliefs about God (e.g., that God exists, is our 
creator, and loves us), then belief in God is probably produced by 
cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan 
successfully aimed at truth (and is thereby probably warranted).
5) If God exists, then belief in God is probably warranted.19
Note that Plantinga is not arguing that theistic belief is warranted; he is 
only arguing that it is probably warranted if true.
Before delving into the premises of this argument, it is worth noting 
its dialectical power to respond to de jure objections. Earlier, I cited Bloom 
as stating that psychologists have discovered that belief in God is the re-
sult of cognitive mechanisms “gone awry.” Nakhnikian seemed to think 
that theistic belief was the result of a “loose screw in there somewhere.” 
Armed with Plantinga’s religious epistemology, the theist can now say,
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume God does not exist. 
However, if God does exist, then theistic belief is probably not a result of 
cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw. Rather, it is likely to be formed 
18Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 189–190.
19This reconstruction is based on the one in § 3 of Moon, “Recent Work,” although I do not 
there mention the “God created us in his image” part.
455PLANTINGA’S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY
by properly functioning, reliable faculties. So, you need a good de facto objec-
tion against theistic belief to get your de jure objection off the ground.
Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not have 
a good argument for atheism. In Plantinga’s words, “This fact by itself in-
validates an enormous amount of recent and contemporary atheology; for 
much of that atheology is devoted to de jure complaints that are allegedly 
independent of the de facto question.”20 Plantinga’s response has played an 
important role in the literature on religious debunking arguments.21
IV. Plantinga’s Argument and the Conflict with Skeptical Theism
IV.A. The Conflict
In the following, I examine the work of Fales and McBrayer and Swenson, 
who claim that skeptical theism conflicts with Plantinga’s religious epis-
temology. When I say that they conflict, I am not saying that any one of 
the premises in Plantinga’s argument is logically inconsistent with any of 
ST1–ST3. I am saying that endorsing ST1–ST3 gives one a reason to doubt a 
premise of Plantinga’s argument.22
Evan Fales asks, “Plantinga argues that an all-loving, omnipotent being 
like God, who created us in his image, would want us to know that he ex-
ists. But is it so clear that we can know what God wants for us?”23 Fales’s 
question might be aimed at premise 1, which states, “If God exists, then 
God created us in his image, loves us, desires that we know and love him, 
and is such that it is our end to know and love him.” To address Fales’s 
question, I will first note an ambiguity in the word “desires.” The con-
sequent of (1) could be saying merely that God has some desire for us to 
know him or that God overall desires it.24 For example, I might desire more 
chocolate cake but not overall desire this, given my stronger desire for 
good health.25 The latter desire certainly does not imply that I do not have 
some desire for the chocolate cake! I will thereby take “desire” in (1) to just 
refer to some desire, not overall desire.
Here is an argument for an affirmative answer to Fales’s question. On 
Plantinga’s understanding of “God,” God has “knowledge, power, and 
love . . . to the maximal degree.”26 As such, God would love intrinsically 
20Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 191.
21See the references in n. 3.
22The discussion in this section is a more in-depth version of a discussion in Moon, 
“Recent Work,” 883.
23Fales “Critical Discussion,” 360.
24I mention this ambiguity in Moon, “Recent Work,” 883, although there I used “all-
things-considered desires” and here, I use “overall desires.” I now prefer “overall desires” 
because, strictly speaking, considerations are not necessarily present in all the relevant sort of 
cases. Thanks to Mike Rea for a helpful comment.
25Moon, “Recent Work,” 883.
26For more on what he means by “God” and “theism,” see Plantinga, Warranted Christian 
Belief, viii.
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valuable persons and desire their good. Furthermore, knowing and loving 
God would be a great good, perhaps a person’s greatest good. (Justifica-
tion: it is a great good to come to know and love exemplary persons, such 
as God, who love you and desire your good.) It follows that God would 
have at least some desire for this great good for us.27
But perhaps Fales is really wondering how we could know what God 
overall wants. He writes,
Many theists—Plantinga among them—have expressed skepticism concern-
ing the possibility of an adequate theodicy. What are the chances that we can 
know what God wants, when he allows Bambi to roast in a forest fire? For 
God’s purposes—indeed his morally significant purposes—may transcend 
our understanding. . . . But indeed, if we are deficient in the way just sug-
gested, then presumably we don’t have any knowledge of God’s purposes.28
Typically, if one wants X, then one will intend to bring about X; the excep-
tion is if one has other reasons to not bring about X. Fales is suggesting 
that God might have such reasons. They will be morally significant rea-
sons (or purposes) that transcend our understanding, so that what God 
intends (and overall wants) to do is outside of our ken.
Justin McBrayer and Philip Swenson make a similar point:
What a sceptical theist is committed to, though, is a general scepticism about 
our knowledge of what God would do in any particular situation. We don’t 
think that atheists or theists can say with any serious degree of confidence 
why God does what he does or why he would or wouldn’t do a certain 
thing. But such a scepticism is healthy. . . . Alvin Plantinga assumes that 
if God exists it is obvious that our belief-forming faculties are reliable. . . . 
Given our scepticism, we are not sanguine about [this] inference (God might 
well have other interests, motives, etc. than the few that we are able to deci-
pher). And this seems entirely appropriate.29
We can see how their affirmation of skeptical theism in the first part of the 
quote leads them to be skeptical about whether God might have unknown 
reasons (i.e., “other interests, motives, etc.”). This in turn leads them to 
be skeptical about what God would overall want or intend. It seems that 
the criticisms of Fales and of McBrayer and Swenson should be aimed at 
premise 2, which states, “If God created us in his image, loves us, desires 
that we know and love him, and is such that it is our end to know and love 
him, then God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be 
aware of his presence and know something about him.”
The connection between ST1–ST3 and premise 2 is this. ST1–ST3 imply 
that we have no good reason to think that we are not in the dark about 
some of God’s reasons. Hence, even if we could know that God desires for 
27Thanks to Emily Bingeman for helping me spell out this argument. For some reasons to 
doubt this argument, see Murphy, God’s Own Ethics.
28Fales, “Critical Discussion,” 360.
29McBrayer and Swenson, “Skepticism About the Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” 
145.
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us to know him, this desire could conflict with God’s desire to bring about 
other unknown goods or prevent some unknown evils. Therefore, we are 
in the dark about whether God would intend for us to know him. This 
gives us reason to doubt (2). Call this the skeptical theist objection.
It is worth distinguishing this objection from a related one that some 
have raised in discussions of this paper. Against (2), some have noted that 
many people do not believe in God, are not aware of God’s presence, and 
do not know and love him. This gives us reason to deny the consequent 
of (2), that God would intend these things. This further gives us reason 
either to deny the truth of the antecedent of (2) (via modus tollens), or to 
deny the truth of the conditional. If we take the first option, then we also 
have reason to deny the antecedent of (1), and hence, an argument that 
God does not exist.30 The second option is to deny (2). So, either we have 
an argument that God does not exist or an argument against (2).31 Neither 
is a good option for a skeptical theist who wants to endorse Plantinga’s 
argument. I will call this the absence of belief objection.32
IV.B. Addressing a Potential Misunderstanding
In this section, I will block a potential misunderstanding of the skeptical 
theist objection. Robert Lovering distinguishes between two views:
(Broad Skeptical Theism) In every case, we cannot know what God 
would do.
(Narrow Skeptical Theism) In some cases, we can know what God would 
do and, in some cases, we cannot.33
One might think that the skeptical theist objection is the following: since 
skeptical theism implies Broad Skeptical Theism, we cannot know that 
God would intend anything in the way described in premise 2.
That is not the objection. First, skeptical theism does not imply Broad 
Skeptical Theism. Here is an example from Bergmann to support this 
claim.34 I know that I exist and that there is a past. Therefore, if God exists, 
then he did not intend to permanently annihilate me before now. Hence, 
30Put this way, assuming the argument for premise 1 was sound, the first option resem-
bles the sorts of arguments in Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument and Marsh, “Darwin 
and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief.” For a non-skeptical theist response to Marsh, see 
Braddock, “Theism, Naturalism, and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief.”
31However, note that it is not obvious that nontheists will never know God. The original 
premise (2) was ambiguous because it was not time-indexed. One could add the words 
“right now” to the end of (2), and the objection sticks. That is how I have been interpreting 
(2). But if we add the words “at some point of time” at the end, then the objection will not 
stick. People’s not knowing about God right now does not entail that God has not intended 
that they will eventually come to know about God.
32Thanks to Robert Adams and Chris Tucker for conversation that helped to clarify this 
objection and its application to the argument. The other premises also raise interesting issues, 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. See Moon, “Recent Work” for more discussion.
33Lovering, “On What God Would Do,” 90.
34Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 15.
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I can know that God did not intend to permanently annihilate me before 
now.35 ST1–ST3 does not conflict with this argument. In general, I can use 
my commonsense knowledge to infer that God did not intend to make 
certain propositions false.36
The skeptical theist objection is saying that, given ST1–ST3, we are not 
in a position to know that God would intend for us to know him in the 
way described in premise 2. Yes, perhaps we can know that God did not 
intend to permanently annihilate us yesterday, and we can infer this from 
our commonsense knowledge. But it seems that we cannot similarly infer 
from our commonsense knowledge that God would intend for us to be 
able to know him. So, even if Narrow Skeptical Theism is true, skeptical 
theism still conflicts with Plantinga’s argument.37
V. What Can We Infer About What God Intends?
In the previous section, I showed how accepting skeptical theism gives 
one a reason to doubt premise 2. Someone might think that all we have to 
do is tweak the premise to strengthen Plantinga’s argument. In this sec-
tion, I show why any such attempts are likely to fail.
V.A. Principles for Deriving God’s Intentions
How are we to know, of any event, that God intended that it occur? We 
saw in the previous section that if we know that an event has occurred, 
then we can know that God did not intend to prevent its occurrence. How-
ever, it is more difficult to know, even of events that we know have already 
occurred, whether God intended for them to occur.
Perhaps one can reason in the following way. For any event that has 
occurred or will occur, God knew that it would occur.38 Furthermore, for 
any event that has occurred or will occur, God played some causal role in 
its occurrence (by being the creator and sustainer of all things). We might 
then affirm the following principle,
(Knowledge-Intention Principle) If God knew that his actions would re-
sult in E’s occurring, then God intended for E to occur,
and conclude that if an event has occurred, God intended for it to occur.
35This example answers the charge in Lovering, “On What God Would Do” (104) that 
Narrow Skeptical Theism is ad hoc.
36See Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 14–16 for other things we could 
know that God would do, even if skeptical theism is true. See also his technical definition of 
‘commonsense knowledge.’
37Rea (“Skeptical Theism,” 485), a skeptical theist, suggests that he can have knowledge 
of God’s reasons for action via scripture. This could, in principle, help Plantinga’s argument, 
but adding propositions from scripture would make the argument more like the one to be 
given in § VI, which is what I call a religion-based argument. I will postpone that discussion 
until then. Also, whether divine revelation conflicts with skeptical theism is itself very con-
troversial, cf. Wielenberg, “Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies” and Segal, “Skeptical Theism 
and Divine Truths.”
38This assumes that open theism is false. I will assume this for the sake of my interlocutor.
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But the Knowledge-Intention Principle is false. Suppose God intends 
to make a bush look like it is on fire. God might also know that this event 
will cause a nearby plant to cast a shadow. But the casting of the shadow 
might not have been God’s intention, despite God’s knowing that his ac-
tions would result in its occurrence. God could have been completely 
indifferent to the shadow.
The problem, one might think, is that God did not have any desire for 
the casting of the shadow. Perhaps the principle just needs to be slightly 
revised,
(Desire-Intention Principle) If God has some desire for E to occur and 
God knew that his actions would result in E’s occurring, then God in-
tended for E to occur.
Returning to the burning bush example, God might have known that 
burning a bush would cause a nearby plant to cast a shadow, but since 
God did not desire it, God did not intend it. However, if we grant that God 
did want there to be a shadow, and that God knew that burning the bush 
would cast the shadow, then it is very plausible that God also intended it.39
Unfortunately, the principle still has a counterexample.40 Consider, first, 
a counterexample to a generalized version of the Desire-Intention Principle, 
one that applies to any agent and not just God. Suppose that before Isaac’s 
death, Esau promises him that he will not take revenge on Jacob for his 
wrongful deeds. Esau still wants Jacob to suffer for his wrongdoings, 
which is what Jacob deserves, but Esau promises to not act on this desire. 
Later that day, Esau sees a trolley headed toward five children. Esau also 
happens to see that if he pulls a switch to divert the trolley from killing 
the five children, then the trolley will hit Jacob instead, which will hurt 
him. Esau decides to pull the switch with the intention of saving the five 
children. Esau knows that his actions will result in Jacob’s suffering. Esau 
also happens to desire for Jacob to suffer, but in keeping with his promise, 
the desire is not his reason for acting; he is acting solely with the intent 
of saving the children. In this case, Esau did not in fact intend for Jacob 
to suffer. After all, he had promised not to take revenge on Jacob, and 
he wanted above all to honor his promise to Isaac. The counterexample 
utilizes the well-known fact that we sometimes have a reason to cause X 
(i.e., a desire for X) that is not the reason why we cause X, which makes it 
possible for us to have not intended to cause X.
I will now provide a counterexample to the Desire-Intention Principle 
that is also relevant to Plantinga’s argument. Imagine a possible scenario 
in which God desires for some person, Fred, to be in a relationship with 
him, and that God knows that his actions will result in Fred’s being in this 
relationship with him. We can add the following to the case:
39Thanks to Kenny Boyce and Josh Smart for help here.
40I thank Philip Swenson for the core idea behind this counterexample. Thanks also to 
Brian Cutter for helpful, clarifying discussions.
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a) God has a reason not to use his desire for a relationship with Fred 
as his reason for action.
This reason would be analogous to the promise-making in the earlier ex-
ample. The reason need not be God’s having made a promise. It could just 
be some other good that would be attained by God’s not using his desire 
for relationship as his reason for action. It seems metaphysically possible 
that there could be such a good.
We could then add,
b) There is some good that God intends to instantiate, such that the 
relationship with Fred is only a known byproduct of that intention.
The good mentioned in (b) would be analogous to the saving of five lives 
in the earlier example. Again, this good need not be the saving of five 
lives. It just needs to be some good, the achieving of which will happen 
to meet God’s desire to have a relationship with Fred. All of this seems 
metaphysically possible. Furthermore, it seems that God will not have 
intended Fred’s being in relationship with him. So, the Desire-Intention 
Principle also has a counterexample.
V.B. The Counterexample and Skeptical Theism
I could imagine the following reply. “Yes, that is a nice metaphysically 
possible counterexample to the Desire-Intention principle. But let us sup-
pose that Fred is a real person in the actual world who has a relationship 
with God. Are you saying that the sort of state of affairs described by (a) 
and (b) obtains in the real world? That seems unlikely!” I will argue that 
we cannot know that it is unlikely, if skeptical theism is true.41
Suppose that ST1 is true. Then we do not have a good reason to think 
that the goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there 
are. We should then suspend judgment about whether, on a cosmic scale, 
there are great goods to be gained if God simply refrains from using his 
desire for relationship with Fred as a reason for action. Hence, we should 
suspend judgment about whether, in the actual world, (a) is true. Further-
more, given ST1, we have reason to suspend judgment about whether, on 
a cosmic scale, there is a great unknown good to be gained, so that God’s 
relationship with Fred is a mere known byproduct of God’s intention to 
actualize that great unknown good. So, we should suspend judgment 
about (b).
Hence, if skeptical theism is true, then we should suspend judgment 
about whether the goods under discussion actually exist. To help drive 
in this point, recall how the skeptical theist uses ST1 to respond to the 
problem of evil. Just as ST1 is supposed to justify withholding judgment 
about whether there is a good that justifies horrendous evils (despite our 
41See Pruss, “Omnirationality,” 5, where he says that it is probably rare for God to be in 
this situation. However, he gives no reason for thinking that this would be the case, given 
skeptical theism.
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being unable to think of any such good), so it should justify withholding 
judgment about whether the goods described by (a) and (b) exist. It might 
initially seem probable that there are no such goods, just as it initially seems 
probable that there is no good that could justify God’s allowing the evils 
of the Holocaust. But if the skeptical theist is right, then we are not in the 
position to make such probability judgments.
In § IV, the previous section, I argued that skeptical theism undermines 
premise 2 of Plantinga’s argument; given skeptical theism, inferences 
about God’s intentions from God’s desires are unjustified. In this section, I 
have gone further by showing how attempts to tweak premise 2 are likely 
to fail. Even if we also stipulated that we knew quite a bit about God’s de-
sires, causal activity, and knowledge, it would still be difficult to properly 
infer anything about God’s intentions, given skeptical theism.42 So, I con-
clude that the conflict between skeptical theism and Plantinga’s argument 
is a deep one that is extremely difficult to overcome.
VI. New Versions of Plantinga’s Argument
VI.A. Religion-Based Arguments
Call Plantinga’s argument a bare-theism-based argument. It moves from the 
bare existence of God, to claims about God’s intentions, and finally to the 
claim that theistic belief is warranted. I showed that such an argument is 
very likely to conflict with skeptical theism. I will now argue that what I 
call religion-based arguments can both be consistent with skeptical theism 
and also have the resources to block de jure objections. These arguments 
do not make inferences about God’s intentions just from God’s bare exis-
tence, but from substantive claims about God’s intentions already made or 
implied in an established religion.
The religion-based argument I discuss in-depth will be based on Chris-
tianity.43 The first premise is
(1*) If Christian belief is true, then God intended for the cognitive facul-
ties of theists who have a “doxastically valuable relationship” to 
form true, theistic beliefs.
I will explain what I mean by “doxastically valuable relationship” and 
“true, theistic beliefs.” S has a doxastically valuable relationship with T only if 
S and T have a valuable relationship that exemplifies goods that entail that 
S believes that T exists.44 Plausibly, one can have a relationship with God 
without believing that God exists. For example, someone might suspend 
judgment about God’s existence but still throw out a hopeful prayer now 
42However, see n. 37.
43Thanks to Kenny Boyce and Mike Rota for convincing me that this is a feasible way 
to go.
44Notice that I avoid referring to those theists who know God, as Plantinga does, because 
this might imply knowledge that God exists, which would take away the point of the argu-
ment. 
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and then. This might be sufficient for some degree of meaningful relation-
ship.45 However, consider the comfort one experiences from believing that 
God is watching over me, or the joy one experiences from believing that God 
loves me, or the thankfulness one experiences from believing that a beautiful 
sunset is a gift from God.46 Intuitively, the comfort, joy, and thankfulness are 
all good things, and this is at least partly because they all involve true beliefs 
(given that Christianity is true). A doxastically valuable relationship with 
God is one that exemplifies these types of goods, goods that entail the 
presence of these theistic beliefs. Furthermore, these beliefs are examples 
of the “true, theistic beliefs” mentioned in (1*).
A doxastically valuable relationship is, by definition, a valuable thing. 
The comfort, joy, and thankfulness are also valuable, and it is plausible 
that having the true beliefs about God that engender these goods is also 
valuable. As we have seen, God would desire these valuable things, and 
for anybody who has them, God would have known ahead of time that 
his causal activity would bring them about. But would it follow that God 
intended those goods? As we saw in section V, the Desire-Intention Prin-
ciple is false; God’s knowingly causing a desired outcome does not entail 
his intending the outcome.
But suppose Christian belief is true. Now, as Plantinga writes, “the term 
‘Christian belief,’ like most useful terms, is vague.”47 He then goes on to 
note that even if a precise line cannot be drawn, such a line is not required 
for his purposes. A precise line is not necessary for my purposes either. I 
firstly need the plausible claim that on the Christian story, God loves hu-
mans, has special plans (or intentions) to redeem humans and bring about 
relationship with them, and intends for himself to be glorified among 
them. These claims are plausible on both liberal and conservative readings 
of the Old and New Testaments. Given these divine plans for the humans, 
it is plausible that doxastically valuable relationships with humans—and 
the possession of correct theistic beliefs that partly constitute those re-
lationships—are among God’s intentions. On the Christian story, God’s 
desire for such relationships is not a reason that God, for some unknown 
reason, decided not to use as his reason for action; the relationships are not 
mere unintended byproducts of some other great unknown cosmic good. 
This makes it plausible that human cognitive faculties forming those true, 
theistic beliefs are part of God’s intentions.
Note that the consequent of (1*) refers only to a certain type of actual 
theist: one with a doxastically valuable relationship with God. Unlike 
Plantinga’s original argument, this one makes no claims about what God 
45Thanks to Allison Thornton for pressing me on this. See also the tapping case and fortu-
itous money case in Poston and Dougherty, “Divine Hiddenness,” 190–193 and the Turing chat 
rooms and the hallucination scenario in Cullison, “Two Solutions,” 120–121 for more developed 
examples of meaningful relationship without belief.
46For a defense of the superiority of “doxastically valuable relationships,” see Schellen-
berg, “On Not Unnecessarily Darkening the Glass,” 201. 
47Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 202.
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would intend for humans generally. This restriction allows my argument 
to avoid the absence of belief objection, since the argument is not about 
those who have no theistic belief.48 The theist also does not need to be 
Christian.49 For example, if Christianity is true, then God was obviously 
intending to have doxastically valuable relationships with Moses and the 
Israelites. Similarly, given the truth of Christianity, a non-Christian theist 
who thanks God in the morning for the day and turns to God in prayer 
during hard times will likely have a doxastically valuable relationship 
with God. If Christian theism is true, then such relationships—and the 
true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute them—are also likely part of 
God’s intentions.50
Some might object by saying it does not follow from Christianity that 
God intends the doxastically valuable relationships (and the relevant 
beliefs) that (1*) ascribes.51 For example, perhaps on some versions of 
Christianity, God only intends for doxastically valuable relationships with 
a small group of elect Christians and not with anybody else. If they are 
right, then (1*) is false.
However, as Plantinga notes, terms like “Christianity” and “Christian 
belief” are vague. I concede that if one uses the terms differently than I do, 
then (1*) will be false. On the other hand, if one uses “Christian belief” as I 
do, then given my above argument, (1*) will likely be true. And that’s how 
I mean “Christian belief” to be understood in the current religion-based 
argument under discussion.52
The next premise states,
(2*) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a 
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form true, theistic beliefs, 
then belief in God is probably produced in such persons by cogni-
tive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan suc-
cessfully aimed at truth in the environment for which those facul-
ties were designed.
It makes the connection between God’s intentions for the cognitive fac-
ulties to produce the true, theistic beliefs and the proper functionalist 
48The question remains whether God intends for all people, including nontheists, to have 
a doxastically valuable relationship with him. This raises issues about divine hiddenness, 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. See the references in nn. 30, 45, and 46.
49Thanks to comments from a referee of this journal, which led to this clarification and the 
rest of this paragraph.
50Note that this religion-based argument is not defending specific Christian beliefs, such 
as beliefs in the Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection, and more. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine how Plantinga’s Extended A/C Model, which centrally includes the claim 
that if Christian belief is true, then Christian belief is warranted, applies to the argument 
here.
51Thanks to Domingos Faria for helpful conversation about this objection.
52Furthermore, such a person might formulate her own religion-based argument with a 
version of (1*) that restricts the doxastically valuable relationships to only the elect. The rest 
of the argument could then be adjusted accordingly.
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conditions for warrant. Why believe (2*)? Suppose its antecedent is true 
and that God did intend for cognitive faculties to produce the relevant, 
true, theistic beliefs. Given that God is also the ultimate designer of human 
cognitive faculties and their environments, it is plausible that when those 
cognitive faculties produce these true, theistic beliefs according to God’s 
intentions, those faculties are functioning properly according to a reliable, 
truth-aimed design plan in the appropriate environments.
From (1*), (2*) and Plantinga’s theory of warrant, we conclude:
(3*) If Christian belief is true, then such theists’ belief in God is probably 
warranted.
Can this new religion-based argument still play the same role of deflecting 
de jure objections that the original bare-theism-based argument did? Let’s 
see how the dialectic might work. Suppose a Christian skeptical theist 
encounters a debunking argument against theistic belief. She could make 
the following sort of reply, which is similar to the one the theist gave in 
section III:
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume Christian be-
lief is false. However, if Christian belief is true, then theistic belief is 
probably not a result of cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw. 
Rather, it is likely to be formed by properly functioning, reliable facul-
ties. So, you need a good de facto objection against Christian belief to get 
your de jure objection off the ground.
Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not 
have a good de facto argument against Christian belief.
This response is dialectically weaker than the one based on the bare-
theism-based argument in the following way. Admittedly, it is easier to 
provide a good de facto objection to Christian belief than to bare theistic 
belief. The former is a much stronger claim, and so there are more ways it 
could turn out to be false. However, so long as the objector has no good de 
facto argument against Christian belief, such a skeptical theist is on good 
ground and can make use of this response.
A religion-based argument need not be Christianity-based. To formu-
late an alternative, we just have to replace the antecedent of (1*) with a 
religion that still implies (1*)’s consequent. In other words, it must be a 
religion that we could plausibly substitute for X in the following premise:
(1**) If religion X is true, then God intended for the cognitive faculties 
of theists who have a doxastically valuable relationship to form 
true, theistic beliefs.
(2*) would remain the same, and then (3*) would be altered to say,
(3**) If religion X is true, then such theists’ belief in God is probably 
warranted,
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so that its antecedent matches the antecedent of (1**). There might also 
be Muslim or Jewish religion-based arguments of this form. However, 
just as the success of the above Christian-based argument depends on the 
relevant version of Christianity, so might Muslim or Jewish religion-based 
arguments depend on the relevant versions of Islam or Judaism.53
VI.B. Intention-Based Arguments
Bare-theism-based arguments move from God’s mere existence to claims 
about theistic beliefs. Religion-based arguments move from a religion to 
claims about certain theistic beliefs. Intention-based arguments move from 
claims about both God’s existence and intentions to claims about certain 
theistic beliefs. These arguments can be used by theists who do not hold 
to a major monotheistic religion but simply believe that God intended for 
theists to have the true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute a doxastically 
valuable relationship with God.54
To formulate such an argument, one can just skip (1*), or any instantia-
tion of (1**), and simply start the argument with (2*):
(2*) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a 
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form the true, theistic be-
liefs, then belief in God is probably produced in such persons by 
cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan 
successfully aimed at truth in the environment for which those fac-
ulties were designed.
And from Plantinga’s theory of warrant, it follows that
(3***) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a 
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form the true theistic be-
liefs, then such theists’ belief in God is probably warranted.
As with the religion-based argument, since it starts with assumptions 
about God’s intentions, there is no good reason to think it conflicts with 
skeptical theism.
Here is how one would use the intention-based argument in a reply to 
a de jure objection:
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume that God 
doesn’t intend for theists who have a “doxastically valuable relation-
ship” to form true, theistic beliefs—that, either God doesn’t exist, or 
that even though he exists, he lacks that intention. However, if God 
exists and does have such an intention, then theistic belief is probably 
not a result of cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw. Rather, it 
53Examining whether this style of argument is open to other religions is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Considerations by Baldwin and McNabb, “An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic 
Belief” might cast doubt on whether there could be a Muslim-based argument of this form.
54Thanks to Tyler McNabb and Brian Cutter for helpful discussion that led to my formu-
lating an intention-based argument.
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is likely to be formed by properly functioning, reliable faculties. So, you 
need a good de facto objection against my theistic belief to get your de 
jure objection off the ground.
Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not 
have a good argument for atheism or a good argument that God did not 
intend as such. And many do not have any such argument.
This reply is also dialectically weaker than the reply based on the bare-
theism-based argument. It is easier to provide a good de facto objection to 
theism + X than to theism. The former is a stronger claim, and so there are 
more ways it could turn out to be false. So, like the religion-based argu-
ment, this new response is dialectically weaker. Fortunately, so long as the 
objector has no good de facto argument against theism+X, such a skeptical 
theist can still make good use of this response.
Here is an objection.55 Suppose the de jure objector has no particular 
good de facto objection to theism. Even so, since I am now adding a very 
particular claim about God’s intentions, doesn’t that make the de facto 
claim unlikely? If so, then perhaps that itself is a good de facto objection to 
my theism + X.
In response, I do not think it is unlikely.56 Compare the claim that God 
intended the faculties of those with doxastically valuable relationships 
to produce their true, theistic beliefs with the claim that God intended 
the ears of philosophers to be homing devices for bees. The latter claim 
does seem unlikely (even if God exists). We already know about the func-
tions of ears, and we know that they have none of the mechanisms that 
would even come close to qualifying as homing devices for bees. On the 
other hand, it is unclear—or at least there is significant disagreement 
about—which cognitive mechanisms give rise to theistic beliefs and what 
the functions of those various mechanisms are.57 Now, suppose that God 
exists. Then it does not seem unlikely that God is the ultimate designer of 
human beings’ cognitive faculties. Given that many humans around the 
world have doxastically valuable relationships with God, it also does not 
seem unlikely that God’s intention was for their cognitive faculties to form 
the true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute the doxastically valuable re-
lationships. We have nothing parallel to the bee case here. So, I think that 
the above de facto objection fails.
I conclude that believers from different religions, as well as many theists 
who do not have a background religion, have at least two Plantinga-
inspired options by which to respond to de jure objections in the spirit 
55Thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.
56Thanks to Brian Cutter for helpful conversation.
57For literature on this topic, see Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe; Bering, The Belief 
Instinct; Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology”; Thurow, “Does Cognitive Sci-
ence Show Belief in God to be Irrational?”; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments”; Braddock, 
“An Evidential Argument for Theism”; and the references in n. 31 of Moon, “Recent Work.”
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captured by the mantra: “Your de jure objection requires a de facto objection 
. . . a de facto objection that you don’t have.”
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that skeptical theism conflicts with one of the premises of 
Plantinga’s argument for the claim that if God exists, then belief in God 
is probably warranted. It follows that a prominent way of responding 
to the problem of evil is in conflict with a prominent way of responding 
to popular de jure objections to theistic belief. This might seem to either 
leave skeptical theists without one of the most influential responses to de 
jure objections, or leave proponents of Plantinga’s religious epistemology 
without a prominent response to the problem of evil. This needn’t be such 
a bad thing; not all theists like skeptical theism, and there are other ways 
to respond to de jure objections.58 However, it still gives theists fewer op-
tions by which to defend their beliefs.
Fortunately, instead of appealing to Plantinga’s bare-theism-based argu-
ment, I have shown that one can appeal to religion-based arguments or an 
intention-based argument, both of which are in the spirit of his religious 
epistemology. They do not conflict with skeptical theism, and they have a 
similar ability to deflect de jure objections. I conclude that even though skep-
tical theists cannot hold to Plantinga’s exact religious epistemology, they 
can still consistently hold to religious epistemologies that are in its spirit.59
Virginia Commonwealth University
58Perhaps this is why in the later part of his career (e.g., Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism”), 
Plantinga started depending more on his O Felix Culpa theodicy. Also, see Thurow, “Does 
Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational?”;” and Braddock, “Theism, Natu-
ralism, and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief” for alternative responses to theistic debunking 
arguments.
59I received help from many people on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks to two 
anonymous referees of this journal and especially to the editor, Mark Murphy, for helpful 
comments. Thanks to Louise Williams for helpful editing. Thanks to Michael Bergmann, 
Hugh Burling, Domingos Faria, Blake McCallister, Kenny Pearce, Michael Rota, and Chris-
tine Wu for helpful conversations. For numerous, helpful extended conversations, thanks 
to Emily Bingeman, Brian Cutter, and Philip Swenson. Thanks to Klaas Kraay, Michael Rea, 
and Chris Tucker for thorough and helpful written comments and conversation. Thanks to 
the audience at the 2016 Eastern Society of Christian Philosophers meeting; to the Notre 
Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion reading group (including Dustin Crummett, John 
and Lorraine Keller, Chris Menzel, Joe Milburn, Sam Newlands, and Michelle Panchuk); 
to the Toronto Works in Progress Philosophy of Religion reading group; to Mark Baker 
and Dean Zimmerman at our cognitive science of religion reading group; to the audience 
at the 2015 Midwest Society of Christian Philosophers meeting (including Rebecca Chan, 
Liz Jackson, Jonathan Reibsaman, Allison Thornton, and Chris Tweedt); to the Pepperdine 
University philosophy club (including Paige Massey and Tomas Bogardus); to Kenny Boyce, 
Wesley Chambers, Chris Gadsden, and Joshua Smart at a University of Missouri reading 
group; and to Dalhousie University’s weekly colloquium (including Kaleb Earl, Scott Edgar, 
Duncan Macintosh, Stephen Maitzen, Letitia Meynell, John Schellenberg, Katie Stockdale, 
and Sheldon Wein).
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